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NOTES

Red Light, Green Light: Has China
Achieved Its Goals Through the 2000
Internet Regulations?
ABSTRACT

In the mid-1990s, when the Internet began to burgeon in
China, many thought that the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP)would finally come to an end. The combination of
foreign capitaland trans-borderinformation exchange promised
a potential influx of democratic ideas and ideals. The CCP
responded with both physical and regulatory limits on the use of
the Internet by the Chinese people.
Some commentators
characterized these limits as feeble attempts by the CCP to
control a nebulous medium. Others viewed the limits as
ineffective steps by the government to become a highly developed
authoritarianstate.
This Note posits that the CCP seeks to do neither. Instead,
the CCP's goal is simple: to reap moderate economic benefits
while retaining political power. By regulating how Chinese
businesses and individuals use the Internet, the CCP retains
political power despite the globalizing effect of the Internet. It
does this by dominating the Internet economy and monitoring
information exchanges to suppress political insurgency, while
deriving economic gain from Internet development. Viewed in
this light, economic and informational regulations are very
much a success for the CCP.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Edward Tian wants to bring broadband Internet access to the
People's Republic of China. 1 Tian is the CEO of China Netcom
Communications (CNC), a state-owned enterprise. 2
At forty
gigabytes per second and twenty thousand kilometers in length, his
project will be one of the fastest and longest bandwidth networks in
3
the world.
In a nation where phone service is a luxury, how can
entrepreneurs like Edward Tian sell bandwidth? The answer is
simple: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) desperately wants to
take advantage of the wealth offered by the Internet. Tian's
motivation, however--"to give a voice to the Chinese people" 4-is
precisely what makes the CCP leery.
One central authority has always governed China. Today, the
Chinese Communist Party rules China. In order to garner support,
the CCP has historically used the media to communicate with the
people. The CCP censors media opinions that dissent from the CCP
message.
The CCP uses similar censorship tactics on the Internet. Like
censorship of traditional media, the CCP uses physical means to block
access to the Internet.
The CCP has also instituted various
regulations delineating permitted and forbidden uses of the Internet.
Most recently, the CCP issued a cluster of regulations in 2000.
These regulations can be divided into two broad categories-economic
and informational. The economic regulations place requirements on
companies doing business online. The informational regulations
1.
2.
is held by
3.
4.

David Sheff, Betting on Bandwidth, WIRED, Feb. 2001, at 146.
Id. at 148-49, 151 (noting that only a very small percentage of the company
employees).
Id. at 146, 152.
Id. at 150.
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restrict the type of information companies can transmit or permit
their users to transmit via the Internet.
With a population of one billion, China represents one of the
largest potential markets in the world. The regulations cost the
Internet industry a considerable amount of revenue. Though the
CCP embraces the Internet and its benefits, it is not willing to
sacrifice control.
Most commentators view the current regulatory scheme as either
a step towards high authoritarianism or as a futile attempt to control
the Internet. However, these views presuppose that the CCP uses
current regulations to achieve a grand predetermined goal-either a
system of government that is similar to that of a highly authoritarian
state or a totalitarian stranglehold on an intangible medium. This
Note refutes both predictions. Analyzing the regulations within their
political and historical context reveals that not only vill the
regulations prove to be effective, but also that the reason they will be
effective is because the CCP's regulation of the Internet is consistent
with its regulation of traditional forms of media. This consistency
allows the CCP to enforce Internet regulations to the extent that
punishment for disobeying regulations on traditional media serves as
a deterrent.
The CCP has used physical restrictions and regulations in
tandem to guarantee that publicly-owned enterprises outperform
private companies, thus ensuring the CCP's political power. In terms
of economic regulations, the CCP favors publicly-owned enterprises
over private companies. Motivated by the promise of economic
development, the CCP is eager to usher the Internet into China, but
not at the expense of its own political power. In the informational
category, the CCP elicits compliance with its strict restraints on
informational content by using the unspoken but ever present threat
of its willingness to squash political insurgency. After Tiananmen
Square, there is no doubt in the mind of the Chinese citizenry that
the CCP will use militaristic force and spectacular punishment to
squelch political opposition.
To illustrate how the CCP has used these two types of
regulations, two representative regulations issued in 2000 will be
analyzed. First, the "Interim Procedures on Registration and Filing
of Online Business Operations" allows the CCP to keep track of
private competitors in the telecommunications industry. Second, the
"Measures for Managing Internet Information Services" places
restrictions on online informational content.
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II. CHINA'S ECONOMY: PAST AND PRESENT
In the past twenty-five years, the CCP has moved China's
economy toward a socialist market economy. 5 Prior to 1978, China
espoused a centralized, government-driven economic structure.6 In
1978, reeling from the effects of both the Cultural Revolution and the
ten-year rule of the Gang of Four, the CCP realized that it needed to
recoup its legitimacy as a leader. 7 To do this, the CCP reformed the
failing economic structure and demonstrated that it could effectively
trigger economic development. 8
The CCP's decision to maintain a one-party authoritarian state
while introducing some elements of a market economy created a
tension that it continues to face to this day. The strength of the
Chinese government stems from its one party system and its ability
to maintain "stability and order" through tight control over
information deemed to be at odds with party ideology. 9 But economic
development often occurs in an environment of decentralized ideas
and decisions, privatization, and "openness to the outside world." 10
These conflicting goals require the CCP to balance economic openness
against its political power. As a result, the CCP walks a fine line
attempting to foster entry into the technological global economy
without falling into political upheaval.
After the Tiananmen Square "power struggle" in 1989,11 the CCP
formally announced that it intended to move towards a socialist
market economy. 12 As a result of this announcement and the ensuing
economic developments, many commentators predicted that the
Chinese government, economic structure, and culture would mimic
those of developed Western nations. Other commentators believed
that this "expectation of convergence" does not take into account
China's current leadership and the fact that it voluntarily embarked
on the road towards a socialist market economy. 13
Instead,
commentators contended that the CCP is consciously steering China

5.
MILTON MUELLER & ZIXIANG TAN, CHINA IN THE INFORMATION AGE:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE DILEMMAS OF REFORM 6 (1997).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
POWER

Id.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 6.
Id. at8.
See generally WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINA AFTER DENG XIAOPING: THE
STRUGGLE IN BEIJING SINCE TIANANMEN 51-133 (1995) (providing

comprehensive details of modem China's path of economic reform).
13.

MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 7.
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towards becoming an economically highly developed, authoritarian
14
state like Singapore.
In the early 1990s, the advent of the Internet in China increased
the tension between economic progress and state control over
information. The increase in the number of both commercial and
non-commercial websites represented a huge economic growth
potential that the CCP was loath to turn away. Instead, the CCP
welcomed the Internet's economic benefits while heavily regulating
the information transmitted by commercial and non-commercial
organizations on their websites.' 5

III.

HISTORY OF THE INTERNET'S DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA

When the Internet emerged in China, it was the result of the
efforts of Chinese computer professionals who did not want the nation
to fall behind technologically. 16 Consequently, there were numerous
distinct and, to some extent, competing initiatives to advance the
Internet that did not fall under the authority of any one
17
governmental ministry or department.
The Internet in China began in 1987 when a professor in Beijing
sent out the first e-mail in China through the Chinese Academic
Network (CAnet), the first computer network in China.18 CAnet
connected to the global Internet indirectly through a gateway at
Karlsruhe University in Germany.' 9
In 1993, the Institute of High Energy Physics in the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (IHEP), a source of Internet development
independent of CAnet, rented a specialized 64K line from AT&T's
international satellite channel to connect to Stanford University. 20 In
May 1994 this closed line was opened to allow full Internet

14.
For example, Mueller and Tan argue that "it is far more realistic to view
China as engaged in the deliberate construction of a gigantic Asian-authoritarian state
than it is to view it as stumbling in an extemporaneous, ad hoc manner toward some
version of liberal capitalism." Id. at 9.
15.
Andrew Higgins, China Tries to Shut Out Internet Anarch., THE GUARDLNN
(London), Sept. 4, 1995, at 9 (reporting that China was creating "an electronic Great
Wall" to shut out "pornography, political dissent, and other forms of 'spiritual
pollutiom"). See generally Peter H. Lewis, Limiting a Medium Without Boundaries;
How Do You Let the Good Fish Through the Net While Bloching the Bad?, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1996, at DI (observing that various governments were seeking to reap the
benefits of the Internet but struggling with methods of screening out the unwanted
elements).
16.
MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 82.
17.
Id.
18.
ChinaOnline, China's Internet Development Timeline, at httpil,,wwv.
chinaonline.com/issues/internet-policy/c9lOl571.asp [hereinafter Timeline].
19.
MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 82.
20.
Timeline, supra note 18.
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operation. 2 ' IHEP set up the first web server and established the
first home page in China. 22 By June 1995, IHEP had established
23
accounts for more than 500 Chinese scientists and professors.
Up until 1995, most networks were used for academic or
research purposes. 24 However, in May 1995, the Ministry of Posts
and Communications (MPT) set up ChinaNET, the first commercial
network in China, in Beijing and Shanghai. 25 Through ChinaNET,
26
the Chinese public was able to access the Internet.
The MPT is responsible for overseeing and regulating the postal
service and telecommunications, as well as telegraph and wire
services. 27 The Ministry of Electronic Industries (MEI) establishes
policy,
conducts
research,
and
makes
telecommunications
equipment. 28 The MEI also has tremendous political power-current
Chinese president Jiang Zemin was formerly a Minister of MEI. 29
Both the MPT and the MEI vied for administrative clout to lead the
30
telecommunications industry.
Almost simultaneously, the top three technical universities in
China-The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS),
Tsinghua
University in Beijing, and Peking University-created the National
Computer Networking Facilities of China (NCFC) in 1992. 3 1 Then, in
1994, the three universities joined to establish a satellite link to the
global Internet. Users of the three individual campus networks then
32
gained access to the global Internet.
The largest Chinese network at the time to connect to the
Internet was the Chinese Education and Research Network
(CERNET). CERNET was established in 1993 to connect all Chinese
educational and research institutions to the Internet. 33 CERNET
was headquartered at Tsinghua University and initially connected to
the Internet through NCFC/CASNET; it obtained its own connection
4
in May 1995.3

21.

MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 83.

22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Richard Cullen & Pinky D.W. Choy, The Internet in China, 13 COLUM. J.
AsIAN L. 99, 105 (1999).
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
William Yurcik & Zixiang Tan, The Great (Fire)Wall of China: Internet
Security and Information Policy Issues in the People's Republic of China, at
http/wvvw.tprc.org/abstracts/tan.txt.
28.
Id. § 2.1.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.

MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 83.

32.
33.

Id.
Yurcik & Tan, supra note 27, § 2.3.

34.

Id.
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The CCP recognized the economic promise of the Internet and
classified its development as a "Golden Project."3a The designation
"Golden Project" refers to high priority proposals that will affect the
growth of the information infrastructure. 3 6
Some examples of
"Golden Projects" are Golden Bridge, Golden Customs, and Golden
Card.3 7
Golden Bridge is a network consisting of economic
information. It links government agencies, state enterprises, and the
public. 3 8 Golden Customs is a data network focusing on trade and its
related licenses and tariffs. 39 Golden Card's purpose is to provide an
infrastructure for a credit card system by connecting business, banks,
and the public with financial networks. 40 More "Golden Projects" are
expected to be added by the government and large corporations as the
41
Internet further develops.
In response to the advances in Internet development resulting
from commercialization and the "Golden Projects," the Chinese
Academy of Sciences established the China Internet Network
Information Center (CNNIC) to supervise China's Internet growth in
June 1997.42 In June 1999, CNNIC reported that 1.46 million
computers were connected to the Internet in China and 3700 websites
had been established. 43 By the end of 2000, a CNNIC official stated
that, according to the most recent survey, more than eight million
computers were connected to the Internet and there were more than
44
thirty thousand websites.

IV. THE INTERNET'S IMPACT
The Internet's rapid growth has provided a medium for
communication and information, as well as a potential for economic
growth.
More intangibly, it has acted as a catalyst for the
fundamental restructuring of society. As a form of media, the

35.
MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 52.
36.
Yurcik & Tan, supranote 27, § 2.1.
37.
MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 52.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at 53.
42.
Timeline, supra note 18.
43.
Jack Linchuan Qiu, Virtual Cemsorship in China: Keeping the Gate
Between the Cyberspaces, 4 IN'L. J. COMi. & PoL'y, Winter 199912000. at 1, 9.
44.
Peter Weigang Lu, Internet Development in China: An Analysis of the

CNNIC Survey Reports, at httplvnvwv.chinaonline.com/commentary-analysL4internet/
currentnews/secure/c00O3160InternetAnalysis.pdf. But see Anita Narayan. LLM ials
Net Survey Contests Official Figures, CHINAONLINE NEWS. Jan. 11, 2001. at
http:/www.chinaonline.comLssuesrmtemet-.policy/NewsArchiveles-protected200I/Janua
/
C01011151.asp (on file with author) (stating that a recent survey may show that the CNNIC
overestimated the number of Chinese Internet users).
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Internet has dramatically increased individuals' abilities to gain
access to information and to communicate with others. In terms of
accessing information, Chinese Internet users employ the Internet
primarily for "pragmatic" reasons. 45 According to the CNNIC Report
of July 1999, the most frequently visited
websites contain search
46
engines, technology news, and free e-mail.
Electronic bulletin board systems (BBS) allow users to readily
communicate with others. 47
Currently, however, most BBS
communications center around "technology, economy, entertainment,
sports, and other apolitical topics. '48 Even though there are
relatively few BBS users communicating with each other about
political and ideological issues, the ability of those who do to mobilize
49
others is taken very seriously by the CCP.
Economically, the Internet has opened up enormous investment
avenues for China. Foreign investors, recognizing the enormous
market potential of China, have funneled hundreds of millions of
dollars into Chinese Internet startups.5"
Similarly, Chinese
entrepreneurs hoped to capitalize on the "world's fastest-growing
Internet market."5 1 However, since most Chinese Internet users
employ the Internet pragmatically and only a small fraction of the
population has a disposable income of twenty thousand dollars or
more, the number of Internet users does not accurately reflect the

45.
Qiu, supra note 43, at 9.
46.
China Internet Network Information Center, Semi-Annual Survey Report
on Internet Development in China, at http://www.cnnic.net.cn/develst/e-9907.shtml.
47.
Qiu, supra note 43, at 9.
48.
Id. at 10.
49.
The Chinese government was "shocked" by the ability of individuals to use
on-line bulletin boards to organize political demonstrations. Stephen Mufson, Chinese
Protest Finds a Path on the Internet; Beijing Tightens its Control; Can't Prevent OnLine Access, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1996, at A9. A student posted a message on an online bulletin board, calling for a protest at the Japanese embassy in Beijing on
September 18, 1996 over Japan's proprietary behavior regarding a group of East China
Sea Islands claimed by China, Japan, and Taiwan. Id. The bulletin board connected
over two hundred Chinese universities and, at the time the article was written,
individuals had already protested in Hong Kong and "hundreds of thousands of
Chinese" had signed a petition denouncing Japan's behavior. Id. The CCP acted
quickly to discourage this type of organization and demonstration without its
permission-notwithstanding its sharing of outrage with the protestors over Japan's
actions-by exiling an organizer of the petition drive from Beijing to Qinghai province,
in far western China. Id. More recently, after the NATO bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade, large numbers of Chinese students demonstrated throughout
China, first learning of organized demonstrations on the web. John Pomfret & Michael
Laris, Chinese React with Anger, Vilify U.S., WASH. POST, May 9, 1999, at Al.
50.
Edward Wong, China'sNew Culture Starting to Take Shape, Minister Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at A13.
51.
Bruce Einhorn et al., China's Tangled Web: Will Beijing Ruin the Net by
Trying to Control It?, BUS. WK. INT'L, July 17, 2000, at 28.
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market for e-commerce. 5 2 Moreover, China's financial infrastructure
is still relatively unsophisticated. Credit card use is limited and nonuniform, leaving buyers and sellers on e-commerce websites with an
in-person cash transaction as the only alternative.53 This effectively
eliminates the global advantage of the Internet." Therefore, the
Internet in China exists largely as a potential market, rather than a
fully developed market.
The Internet has also vastly altered the Chinese social structure.
People who otherwise might have remained in one province,
restricted to a limited set of opportunities, find themselves more
mobile and entrepreneurial as a direct result of using the Internet.5 5
However, only those who have access to a computer connected to the
Internet are exposed to these opportunities. Consequently, there is a
sharp divide between those who do have access and those who do
not.5 6

Currently, most Internet users are educated, male, and

clustered around China's wealthiest cities.5 7 So, while those with
access are able to transcend geographical boundaries and attain
greater opportunities, those who cannot gain Internet access are
comparatively worse off than before the introduction of the Internet.G8
V. INTERNET INFORMATION FLOW: A CHALLENGE TO CHINA'S
CONTROL CAPABILITIES

China's history dictates a governmental system in which power
is vested in a single body. Philosophically, Confucianism still
underpins many Chinese cultural beliefs. Confucianism advocates
the principle of the Rule of Man.5 9 The Rule of Man envisions a sage
emperor ruling over his subjects astutely and firmly. 60 Under

52.
Id. at 57. John B. Stuttard, a London-based PricewaterhouseCoopers
consultant who was chairman of China operations for the firm up until 1999 observed

that, -'[t]he amount of hype and hot money going into the China Internet was
preposterous... [t]he Web is growing fast, but what the Chinese really are doing with
it is sending e-mails or surfing for free information .

..

China is not ready for e-

business.' Id.
53.
54.

Id. at 56.
See id.

55.

John Pomfret, Chinese Web Opens Portals to New Way of Life; Booming

Internet Splits Haves and Have-Nots, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2000, at Al. For example.
twenty-five year old Wang Siping, from Qinghai-one of the "poorest regions in China,"
posted her picture on a personals website and met the man she now works for as a
secretary in Hong Kong. Id.

56.
57.
58.

Id. at A26.
Id.
See id.

59.
VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 13, 25 (1978).

60.

Id. at 25.
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Confucianism, each person finds his or her place in society, which in
turn promotes stability. One finds one's place in society by using five
key relationships as guidance: parent and child, elder and younger
brothers, husband and wife, friend and friend, and master and
follower. 61 Respect for authority is thus engrained in Chinese culture
62
because it ensures stability.
In line with Confucianism, prior to economic reforms, the CCP
63
promulgated party ideals and conveyed them through the press.
The press was bound to express the party ideals, both by its duty as a
64
faithful subject and by the CCP's strict censorship and editing.
Traditionally, the CCP has controlled the media through direct
government regulation, censorship, and strict enforcement. 65 In the
1960s, Mao Zedong replaced the leading journalists at national and
local newspapers with those who were willing to follow the
government's directives. 66 Through the "official" press, the CCP
communicated Party ideals and goals. 67 The official press provided a
vehicle for the CCP to generate popular support for the government's
policies and actions.68 In addition, the media also served as an
information filter for the public by distilling certain events and public
actors into black-and-white terms; they were portrayed as "in-line"
with the party or opposed to it.69
Within the past fifteen years, the CCP squelched perceived
threats to its power through heavy censorship of traditional media.
After Tiananmen Square, the CCP eliminated almost thirteen
percent of all publications. 70 More recently, in September 1996,
President Jiang Zemin set forth the "Strike Hard" campaign to
'7 1
cleanse printed publications and television of "spiritual pollution."
Through the campaign, Jiang aimed to encourage the media to
participate in self-censorship and sought ultimately to stamp-out
politically untoward speech. 72 Jiang laid out six requirements for

61.
RASHID MALIK, CHINESE ENTREPRENEURS IN THE ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT
OF CHINA 94 (1997).

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
LI, supra note 58, at 15.
Id.
Id.

66.

ARTICLE 19 STAFF, WORLD REPORT 1988:

INFORMATION, FREEDOM, AND

CENSORSHIP 132 (Kevin Boyle ed., 1988).
67.

SUZANNE OGDEN, CHINA'S UNRESOLVED ISSUES:

POLITICS, DEVELOPMENT

AND CULTURE 150 (3d ed. 1995).
68.
Id.
69
Id. at 150-51.
70.
Scott E. Feir, Regulations Restricting Internet Access: Attempted Repair of
Rupture in China's Great Wall Restraining the Free Exchange of Ideas, 6 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'YJ. 361, 377 (1997).
71.
Wendy Lei, Note, Econwmic Boon or Regulatory Bane? The Emergence of
the Internet in Modern China, 22 RUTGERS L. REC. 6 (1997).
72.
Publishor be Ideologically Damned,ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1996, at 41.
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journalists to fulfill, including adherence to Mao Zedong's teachings
73
and the CCP's basic ideology.
When the CCP is unable to cut undesirable information off at the
source, it then turns to enforcement measures involving severe and
memorable punishment to deter others from considering participating
in "counterrevolutionary" activities. 74
For example, following
Tiananmen Square, many student protesters were imprisoned for
76
long periods of time 75 or simply executed.
Regulation of the Internet can be traced back to Tiananmen
Square. 77 On June 4, 1989, the CCP stationed monitors at every fax
machine in China to intercept foreign transmissions to protesters,
since protesters had largely been using fax machines to communicate
with each other inside and outside of China. 78 The Internet replaced
the fax machine as a more efficient means of communication for those
79
disagreeing with CCP policy.
At first glance, the Internet would seem to pose a unique
challenge to China's ability to control the flow of information. The
Internet, a global network of local networks comprised of
innumerable computers, is by its nature decentralized and subject to
no singular center of authority.8 0 Each individual or organization
that wishes to have access to the Internet pays for the link and the
necessary equipment. 8 '

73.
Id.
74.
The term "counterrevolutionary" encompasses activities that run contrary
to the CCP and is therefore quite broad. For instance, after Tiananmen Square. a man
was sentenced to ten years in prison for spreading "counterrevolutionary propaganda"
when he stood on the Beijing Railway Station platform and stated that "more than
20,000 people were killed on July 3-4 [1989] and some were crushed to 'meat pie' by
tanks." Rumour-Monger Sentenced to Imprisonment in Dalian, XINHUA NEWs AGENCY,
July 14, 1989. The article, published by the Xinhua New Agency, reported that the
statement was counterfactual. Id. The Xinhua News Agency is run by the CCP. Lei.
supra note 71.
75.
For example, Zhang Weiping, a 25 year old art student in China was
sentenced to nine years in prison for calling in to Voice of America, a network run by
the U.S. government which is broadcast in China, and stating that students had
marched to the Hangzhou provincial headquarters to protest the "army assault" on the
protesters in Beijing. Michael Weisskopf, China Sentences Student to Prison;Man Gets
9 Years for Spreading News of Protests on VOA Program, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1989,
at A15. Zhang was accused only of "spreading news" of the rebellion and not of
actually inciting it. Id.
76.
Paul Theroux, Letters From Hong Kong: Ghost Stories, NEW YORKER, May
12, 1997, at 60.
77.
Yurcik & Tan, supra note 27, § 3.0.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
See generally G. BURGESS ALLISON, THE Le'wYER'S GUIDE TO THE IN'rERNET
29-43 (1995) (explaining how the Internet works).
81.
Id. at 30.
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Moreover, the Internet's design expects that faults within the
system will occur.8 2 Therefore, when a link or a computer fails,
To access blocked
packets adapt and automatically reroute.8 3
information, a user can just use an alternate route. By methods such
as e-mail aliases and changing newsgroup names, users can easily
84
route around censors.
Finally, any technological censorship scheme is effective only to
the extent that human behavior is completely predictable. 8 5 A
technological censorship scheme can only guard against human
Two instances of "unforeseeable
behavior that it can foresee.
With
"substitutability" and
"tunneling."8 6
conduct" are
substitutability, when one Internet Service Provider (ISP) is
censored, users move to another type of provider that can provide
essentially the same service. For example, if e-mail is censored, a
user might instead send messages via the web. 87 In tunneling, a user
can employ several different uncensored Internet services to rebuild
88
the functionality of censored Internet services.
Despite these challenges, the CCP has been remarkably effective
in using a combination of physical restrictions and regulations to
control the Internet.
A. CurrentMethods of Controlling the Internet
Many argued that because of the Internet's amorphous nature,
the CCP would not be able to use traditional methods to regulate
Internet information flow. 89 Nonetheless, the CCP's current methods
for regulating the Internet closely resemble its methods of controlling
traditional media. The CCP controls the Internet through physical
restrictions, regulations that dictate permissible use, and ownership
and operation of ISPs.

82.

Yurcik & Tan, supra note 27, § 4.2.

83.

Id.

84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
See Feir, supra note 70, at 378 (asserting that "banning access to
89.
information on the Internet may be far more difficult than banning a hard copy
publication.").
See also John H. Taylor, III, Comment, The Internet in China:
Embarking on the 'nformation Superhighway" with One Hand on the Wheel and the
Other Hand on the Plug, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 621, 642 (1997) (arguing that it would be
"nalve" to think that the Chinese government could regulate the use of the Internet by
the Chinese people).
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1. Physical Restrictions
The simplest way to have complete control over the Internet
would be to physically prevent a connection to the global Internet.
The CCP has many options in attempting to physically block
information from the Internet from entering Chinese boundaries. 90
First, the CCP has attempted to create the world's largest intranet. 9 1
An intranet is a vehicle for connecting members of the organization to
organizational information.
Intranets are commonly used by
organizations to allow members within the organization to
communicate with each other and to provide members with Internet
application tools such as web browsers to retrieve organizational
information. 92 The organization can completely control the intranet,
and, if a connection to the global Internet is somehow established, a
"firewalr" can preclude any computers on the global Internet from
infiltrating computers on the organization's intranet.
Establishing an intranet is an attractive solution for many
reasons.
First, intranets are easily implemented because the
infrastructure and technology parallel that of the Internet, which
already exists--computers, software, and connectivity. 93 Second,
intranets are highly effective in providing organizational members
with instant access to organizational information. A web-based
intranet also allows the CCP to track web use in general and monitor
the web use patterns of individuals. 94 Finally, and most significantly
from the CCP's perspective, intranets are completely secure from the
Internet; though an intranet can be connected to the Internet and
95
commonly are, a connection is not necessary.
When an Internet connection is established despite the
organization's desire to isolate the intranet, a firewall is capable of
preventing unwanted computers from connecting to the intranet. A
firewall is a "computer or group of computer systems that enforces an
access control policy between two networks by blocking traffic or
permitting traffic."9 6 Usually, a firewall consists of one computer in

90.
See Yurcik & Tan, supranote 27, § 3.0.
91.
If the CCP succeeds in constructing an intranet to take advantage of the
already existing Internet connectivity while keeping out unwanted information, then it
would be the largest intranet in the world. Id. at Abstract.
92.
Id. § 4.2.1.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.

95.
Id.
Id. § 4.2.2. Yurcik and Tan state that the term "firewall for the security
96.
filtering system is a poor analogy since, in reality, concrete firewalls are designed to
stop fires from moving from one part of the building to another. Instead, they suggest
that comparing the security filtering system to a fire door is more apt since it allows
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between the intranet and the global Internet, sifting out packets
according to a set of rules. 97 The use of firewalls for network security

is extremely efficient because it eliminates the need to distribute a
set of rules to each computer on the intranet. Instead, security
measures such as sets of rules are amalgamated on firewall
systems. 98

The centralized location of the firewall allows for

convenient summarizing of Internet traffic, monitoring of attempts to
hack through the firewall, and sampling of the connections entering
and exiting the firewall. 99
Similar to the CCP's censorship of traditional media, the
government decided in August 1996 to block access to approximately
one hundred websites.' 0 0 The CCP did this by constructing the
"Great Chinese Firewall," preventing the Chinese Internet user from
accessing specified websites or websites that contain specific terms. 01'
The banned websites ranged from the websites of major U.S.
newspapers to those containing information on Taiwan and Hong
Kong.' 2- The government asserted that the websites were blocked
10 3
because they were "suspected of carrying spiritual pollution."
For a firewall to function, it must first and foremost be resistant
to attacks. Once a firewall is susceptible to attacks, not only does it
cease to effectively filter out information, but it also becomes a
possible liability.' 0 4 When a firewall is penetrated, the set of rules
can be easily altered, sometimes to do exactly the opposite of what the
firewall owner intended it to do.105
For a firewall to be effective, information must first pass through
it. A firewall cannot filter Internet traffic that does not route through
it, just as a water filter cannot filter soil out of water that does not
pass through the filter. Therefore, Internet traffic that can route

most of the information through while keeping the unwanted information, or the fire,
out. Id.
97.
Id.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.

100.
Taylor, supranote 89, at 635.
101.
Niall McKay, China: The Great Firewall,WIRED, at http://www.wired.com/
news/print0,1294,16545,00.html. Though effective against the lay Chinese Internet
user, more sophisticated "hackers" or "hacktivists" have little trouble tampering with
these firewalls. Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Wayne Arnold, Cyberpatrols: Censoring the Net Isn't Easy, But It Can Be
Intimidating,ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1996, at 1.
104.
Yurcik & Tan, supra note 27, § 4.2.2.
105.
In one instance, "crackers" from the United States had penetrated and
disabled five Chinese firewalls created to prevent Chinese Internet users from seeing
various websites. See, e.g., McKay, supra note 101. In protest over the imprisonment
of Lin Hai, a Chinese man arrested for "simply sending e-mail to the U.S.," one
American cracker defaced a government website. Id. Another cracker group stated
that it had begun developing an e-mail plug-in that would allow Chinese Internet users
to see blocked websites via e-mail. Id.
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around the firewall symbolizes a considerable threat that is
impervious to firewaU defenses. 0 6 In China, an Internet user could
circumvent the firewall by dialing into an international Internet
07
connection and accessing the uncensored Internet.
Though these two models of physically blocking information from
reaching Chinese Internet users are equally viable, the CCP has
elected to use an extensive firewall system, allowing access to the
global Internet but accompanied by heavy filtration. 108
2. Internet Regulations
The State Council, the executive branch of the National People's
Congress, has the authority to set forth regulations that "carry the
force of law over the entire country." 10 9 To carry out these
regulations, the State Council depends on numerous ministries, each
having a specific jurisdiction. 110 On February 1, 1996, in the
Provisional Regulations for the Management Networking with
Information Networks of the People's Republic of China (1996
Provisional Regulations), the State Council mandated that all
connections to the global Internet would be provided by the MPT.1'1
Essentially, the MPT had the authority to screen out information
antagonistic to the CCP before it ever reached the lay Chinese
Internet user. In 1998, the CCP replaced the MPT and the Ministry
of Electronic Industry (MEI) with the Ministry of Information
Industry (MU) as part of a restructuring effort.1 12
The 1996 Provisional Regulations were the CCP's first major
efforts to control the Internet via regulations that carried the force of
law. In addition to naming the MPT as the sole provider of
international Internet access, the 1996 Provisional Regulations, in
113
broad strokes, proscribed using the Internet for certain purposes.
Namely, individuals could not use the Internet to transmit
information "prejudicial to state security," "leak[ing] state secrets," or

106.

Yurcik & Tan, supra note 27, § 4.2.2.

107. Id. However, such a call would probably be much too expensive for most
Chinese people. Id.
108. Id.
109.
Feir, supra note 70, at 369. The source of the State Council's authority is
found in articles 57 and 85 of the Chinese Constitution. Id. at 368-69.
110. Id. at 369.
111. Id. at 368-69.
112.
Jiang-yu Wang, The Internet and E-Commerce in China: Regulations,
Judicial Views, and Government Policies, COMPUTER & IN-TERLNET LAW., Jan. 2001, at

12, 13.
113.

Feir, supra note 70, at 371.
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"producing,

retrieving, duplicating, or disseminating anything
1 14
public order."
to
prejudicial
The 1996 Provisional Regulations also place the burden of
monitoring message content on companies who provide services via
the Internet. 115 Service providers are thus subject to noncompliance
penalties if any content is found to fall into an illegal category. 116
This liability caused foreign companies to reconsider whether the
benefits of doing business on the Internet in China outweighed the
costs.

117

Additionally, on February 14, 1996, the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) issued a circular mandating that all Internet users
register with the MPS within thirty days. 118 The MPS is responsible
for law enforcement at all levels of government. The MPS also has
authority to investigate computer crimes, furnish computer security
training, and institute computer security regulations. 119
Most recently, the CCP instituted a cluster of regulations in 2000
strikingly similar in nature to the 1996 Provisional Regulations. 120
These regulations can be separated into two categories: economic and
informational. Economic regulations encompass the CCP's efforts to
impose stringent requirements on those doing business on the
Internet, or Chinese dot-coms.
Informational regulations are
targeted at Internet content deemed objectionable, regardless of its
source.

VI. 2000 EcoNoMic AND INFORMATIONAL REGULATIONS
To better understand the CCP's motivations for these two types
of regulations, a representative regulation from each of the two
categories will be examined. In the economic category, the Interim
Procedures on Registration and Filing of Online Business Operations
(Procedures) was issued on September 2, 2000. In it, the CCP set
forth the requirements for "business Web sites.''1 1
According to
Article 4 of the Procedures, a "business Web site" is a website that is

114.
Id. Such activities are nebulously defined based on past interpretation in
different contexts. Id. at 371-74. For instance, a speech by Jiang Zemin was deemed a
"state secret" when it was leaked to a Hong Kong newspaper and published a week
before it was given. Id. at 372.
115.
Id. at 382.
116.
Id.
117.
Id. at 382-83.
118.
Yurcik & Tan, supranote 27, § 3.0.
119.
Id.
120.
Interim Procedures on Registration and Filing of Online Business
Operations, at http://www.chinaonline.com (on file with the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW) [hereinafter Procedures].

121.

Id. art. 1.
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wholly or partially owned by an "enterprise" or that "engages in
business operations aiming to make a profit." 2 2 The definitional
prong of engaging in "business operations aiming to make a profit" is
broad enough to encircle the entire commercial sector of China's
Internet industry. Once an individual operates such a website, or an
"enterprise" is an owner of a commercial or non-commercial website,
123
the owner must apply for filing and registration with the CCP.
Additionally, the owner must also maintain personnel for
"information checks" by the CCP to ensure that "unlawful
information or information that harms social morals and efforts to
build a socialist civilization with a high cultural and ideological level"
is eliminated. 12 4
Essentially, only those companies that are able to obtain a
license from the MII will be allowed to do business. On January 4,
2001, Sina.com announced that the MI had decided to grant the
company an operating license. L25 Sina.com was the first private
commercial Internet company in China to obtain CCP approval for a
license. 126 Wang Zhidong, president and CEO of Sina.com, stated
that the grant "demonstrate[d] the government's commitment to
provide a stable business environment that encourages growth of the
Internet industry as a whole." 2 7 The nature of the statement reveals
the underlying bargain: the right to continue to operate a potentially
highly profitable business in exchange for the public and unequivocal
support of CCP policy.
Prior to the Procedures, many hoped that the Internet would
quickly revolutionize China by creating a "new corporate elite" of
Chinese entrepreneurs who would introduce millions of citizens to
information previously off-limits, resulting in a new and dynamic
s
Chinese economy.m2
Some even speculated that the new Internet
economy would lead inevitably to democratization.m2s
However, the CCP's desire to control the Internet and thus the
development of a corporate elite became explicit in the Procedures.

122.
Id. art. 4.
123.
Id. art. 5.
124.
Id. art. 6.
125.
SINAcom Becomes First Internet Company to Receive ICP License in
China, PR NEWSWNME, Jan. 4,2001.
126.
Id.
127.
Id.
128.
Einhorn et al., supra note 51, at 29. These hopes were in part spurred by
the fact that a "little-known" portal called Chinadotcom raised $84 million in a Nasdaq
offering. Id.
129.
This "hope" essentially encapsulates the technocratc viewpoint that
economic modernization and development will take place upon implementation of new
information technology. MUELLER & TAN, supra note 5, at 14-15.
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Flouting critics, 130 the CCP succeeded in controlling and using the
Internet for its own purposes.
In the eyes of foreign investors and Chinese entrepreneurs alike,
the Procedures represent obstacles in the path towards wealth and
ensuing economic development. It would seem that the CCP has
sacrificed enormous economic growth in favor of preserving a
"socialist civilization with a high cultural and ideological level."1 31
Though the preservation of such a "civilization" was certainly aided
by the Procedures, far more importantly, the CCP secured wealth
from the Internet industry for itself by effectively handicapping the
competition.
The Procedures exemplify how the CCP funnels power to itself
with its existing authority. Through these regulations, the CCP
creates an economic pecking order: private companies are at the
bottom, those with personal relationships with government officials,
or guanxi, are in the middle, and the CCP itself is at the top. For
instance, in 1999, entrepreneur Joseph Chen and two Chinese
classmates from Stanford University launched a portal named
ChinaRen Inc. and raised millions of dollars from investors. 132 In a
short period of time, ChinaRen looked like it would emerge as the
leader of the new Internet industry. 133 However, when it was time to
give the investors a return, Chen came up largely empty-handed due
to detailed regulations and the limited number of Chinese Internet
134
users who are able to engage in e-commerce.
ChinaRen would likely have been in a much better position if
Chen had some guanxi with the CCP. Guanxi is no guarantee of
success, however. Even some entrepreneurs who have direct ties to
the government
find similar regulations
prohibitive
and
counterproductive. 1 35 One well-connected entrepreneur notes that
the "CEO has to spend all of his time dealing with the bureaucrats
instead of dealing with his own business.' 36
In contrast, CCIDNet.com, a CCP backed website which offers
news, e-commerce, and consulting services in the electronic industry,
is looking to expand from its Beijing headquarters. CCIDNet's chief

130.
Former President Bill Clinton dismissed the CCP's efforts to control the
Internet as impossible. Specifically, he likened the effort to '"trying to nail Jell-O to the
wall."' Ellen Bork, The Red Internet, WASH. POST, June 17, 2000, at A19.
131.
Procedures, supra note 120, art. 6.
132.
Einhorn et al., supra note 51, at 28.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. at 31. For example, Wang Boming, executive vice-president of the Stock
Exchange Executive Council, a government-sponsored group is also the entrepreneur
behind ChinaWeb, a website that provides financial information. Id. However, he
believes that the CCP cost the Internet industry over two billion dollars with its
regulations. Id.
136.
Id.
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shareholder is a subsidiary of the MII, the very ministry that
regulates the Internet industry.1 3 7 So, while private entrepreneurs
are busy fulfilling the requirements set forth by the CCP, the CCP is
free to reap the financial benefits of the Internet.
In the informational category, the Measures for Managing
Internet Information Services (Measures) were issued on September
25, 2000. This was the CCP's effort to restrict ISPs from providing
certain types of information.13 8 The Measures are intended to
regulate "[i]nternet information services (IIS) and promot[e] the
healthy and orderly development of such services." 13 9 IIS is defined
broadly as "services that provide Internet users with information via
the Internet."140 HS are then classified into commercial and noncommercial providers. 141 Commercial IS refers to providing Internet
users with information in "exchange for compensation" or "providing
Web page creation services. '142 It is possible to interpret this
definition narrowly or broadly. 143
If interpreted narrowly, the
Measures would only apply to those commercial IS providers who
charge fees for access to their websites. 144 Alternatively, a broad
reading would include IS providers who generate indirect income
from their website. For example, an IIS provider could provide free
access to Internet users but derive income from companies who
advertise on their website. 14 Though a narrow reading is possible,
the Measures will most likely include a broad range of commercial XIS
providers. The broad reading is consistent with similar regulations.
Local regulations in Beijing state that the term "business-oriented
IIS" encompasses deriving income from activities such as online
1 46
advertising and "web design" services.
Once an IIS provider falls within the commercial sphere, the
Measures dictate that it must apply to the local IIS administration or
the MII to obtain a license to "operate an IS value-added
telecommunications business." 147 In September 2000, the MII issued
the new Telecommunications Regulations in which IIS was expressly
included in the definition of "value added telecommunications

137.
Id.
138.
Measures
for
Managing
Internet
Information
Servzces,
at
http'ilwvw.chinaonline.com (on file with the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TILNS NZATIONAL
LANv) [hereinafter Measures].
139.
Id. art. 1.
140.
Id. art. 2.
141.
Id. art. 3.
142.
Id.
143.
Paul McKenzie, China's State Council Issues New Rules Goeniing "Internzet
Information.Seruices,"at http'/lwww.perkinscoie.comresourintldo-Jnev,-nles.ht.

144.

Id. § 1.

145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Measures, supranote 138, art. 7.
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business." 148 As a result, an assortment of online businesses are
suddenly finding that they qualify as "telecommunications operators"
and are subject to the telecommunications regulatory scheme set
forth in the Telecommunications Regulations. 14 9 Non-commercial IIS
providers must "report [their] operations for the official records" to
the local telecommunications administrative office or directly to the
MII. 15 0 Both commercial and non-commercial IIS providers must
display their licenses and record numbers, respectively, on the home
page of their websites. 151 In addition, IIS providers must "guarantee
that its information
is legal," and therefore must censor heavily to
152
avoid severe fines.
The Measures layer the duty of self-monitoring on top of the duty
of self-censorship. 15 3 IIS providers are required to keep a record of
information distributed, when it is distributed, and the web address
where the information is located. 154 ISPs are under similar
obligations: they must record when a subscriber accessed the
Internet, the subscriber's account number, the addresses of the
websites visited, and the telephone numbers the subscriber uses.155
IIS providers and ISPs must keep these records on file for sixty days
and be able to "furnish them to the relevant state authorities upon
demand

....

"156

As for the actual informational content, IIS providers are
prohibited from producing, reproducing, releasing, or disseminating
information that "goes against the basic principles set in the
constitution . . . endangers national security, divulges state secrets,

subverts the government, [or] undermines national unity."'157 The
information also may not harm the "honor and interests of the state,"
cause ethnic strife, spread rumors, decrease social stability, spread
pornography, undermine state religious policy, or preach the
teachings of "evil cults.'

158

This list of prohibited information is strikingly similar to the
of prohibited activities in the 1996 Provisions. Some argue that
2000 regulations are simply a reiteration of old regulations and
issued to remind citizens and officials alike to obey the

148.
149.
150.

151.
152.
153.
websites,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

list
the
are
old

McKenzie, supra note 143, § 1.
Id.
Measures, supranote 138, art. 8.
Id. art.12.
Id. art. 13.
Id. arts. 15-16 (outlining types of information not allowed on 11S provider
which the providers must censor themselves).
Id. art. 14.

Id.
Id.
Id. art. 15.
Id.
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regulations.1 59 Due to the unstable rule of law in China, the "new"
regulations are actually "more detail on the same topic," which leads
to more "transparency" in the law, rather than new types of
authoritarianism. 160 A transparent and stable regulatory system in
turn reduces the chance that a government will institute
unpredictable restrictions to limit private investment or support one
competitor over another. 16 1 Transparent regulation is therefore a
favorable and desired circumstance for investors because they can
make rational investment decisions ahead of time. 162
The Measures also provide that a commercial US provider must
obtain consent from the MU before listing on a stock exchange in
China or abroad, and before entering into a joint venture with a
foreign business. 163 Once the MII consents, foreign investment is
capped according to the "relevant laws and administrative
regulations." 164 Though China's accession to the WTO is expected in
the next few months, there are no current "relevant laws" pertaining
to the permissible proportion of foreign investment in a Chinese
Internet company. 165
Prior to the WTO agreement, China used the "Chinese-ChineseForeign" (CCF) approach to limit the amount of foreign investment in
its telecommunications industry. 166 According to this approach, a
Chinese company that was licensed to operate a network established
1 67
a joint venture that functions as an investment "clearinghouse."
Three way contracts between the Chinese network operator, the
Chinese joint venture company, and the foreign investor "combine
equipment leasing, royalties, consulting[,] and license fees in a
network supply contract in lieu of direct equity investment." i S The
CCP's permission to use CCFs seemed to indicate a willingness to

159.
David Cowhig, China-New Net Rules Not a Nuisance? CHINAON.uNTE
NEWS, Dec. 5, 2000. The author argues that when the CCP issues "new" regulations, it

is doing so to elucidate old regulations that were plagued with vagueness. Id. The
strong, largely Western, media reaction to the 2000 regulations can be attributed to
differences between Chinese lawmadng and Western lawmaking. The signature of
Chinese laws and regulations is a "vague, ubiquitous style," while Western laws are
generally more precise. Id. In light of this distinction between the two styles of
lawmaking, the 2000 regulations are neither new nor noteworthy. Id.
160. Id.
161.

Rachelle B. Chong & Wendy Chow, Financing Telecommunicatins Projects

in Asia: A PromisingRegulatory Perspective, 52 FED. COLM. L.J. 1, 6 (1999).
162. Id.
163.
Measures, supra note 138, art. 17.
164. Id.
165.
James Kynge, Dotcoms in China Face up to New Rules, FIN. TIES
(London), Oct. 4, 2000, at 10.

166.
167.

Chong & Chow, supra note 161, at 5.
Id.

168.
Ken Zita, Will China Embrace Competition? Foreign Equtv in Telecoms
Hangsin the Balance, at http-/web.syr.edul-ztan/KenZita-PTC99.html.
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169
open the telecommunications market up to foreign investment.
However, in 1998, the CCP officially forbade the use of the CCF
Unicorn,
a state-owned
model.' 7 0
Then, in
early 1999,
telecommunications company that had used the CCF model, froze
approximately sixteen million dollars of foreign investors' revenue
and proceeded to buy out the investors. 17 1 Foreign investors were
given until August 1999 to break their joint venture contracts or
forego
the possibility of receiving any revenue on their
investments. 172 These moves reflected the CCP's decision to decrease
foreign participation in China's telecommunications industry. 173 The
CCP bought back the foreign investors' shares in Unicorn in order to
list them in Hong Kong and other exchanges as a means of increasing
foreign financial investment as opposed to foreign strategic
174
investment.
Though most companies doing business in China did not find the
provision limiting foreign investment overly prohibitive, investors'
perceptions that the regulations were overly prohibitive were enough
to create a negative impact. 17 6 Two days after the Measures were
issued, the price of the shares of China's three largest portals fell
dramatically in the New York market. 176 However, the executives at
both Sina.com and Sohu.com stated that they had anticipated new
177
regulations and were already in compliance with the Measures.
Currently, there are no laws in China permitting foreign investment
in Internet companies. However, whether the MII will crack down on
foreign-invested Internet companies before China officially joins the
WTO is not clear. According to the WTO rules, China has pledged
that it will allow foreign companies to own up to a forty-nine percent
stake in ICPs once it is admitted to the WTO and then fifty percent
178
after it has been in a member of the WTO for two years.

VII. A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO THE INTERNET REGULATORY SCHEME
Two commentators refer to governmental efforts to control the
Internet as "bootstrapping" control of the physical world into control

169.
Chong & Chow, supra note 161, at 5.
170.
Id.
171.
Gordon G. Chang, Unicorn HighlightsReform Paradox,S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 26, 1999, at 12.
172.
Wang Xiangwei, China Unicon Gives CCF Investors August Quit Deadline,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 1999, at 1.

173.

Chang, supra note 171, at 12.

174.

Id.

175.
176.

James Kynge, supranote 165, at 10.
Sina.com fell by 12.4%, Sohu.com by 6.45%, and Netease.com by 5.75%. Id.

177.
178.

Id.
Id.
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of the electronic world."179 Governments can do this in several ways.
First, since governments can control the physical land over or under
which the information must pass, they can set conditions for the
installation and operation of network equipment. I8 0
Second,
governments can control information with their existing authority to
allow or forbid foreign companies to do business within their physical
borders.' 8 '
Governments can set conditions for the physical construction of
network equipment more effectively if there is little or no existing
electronic infrastructure. 18 2 Therefore, it is far more probable that a
nation like China would be successful at controlling what enters or
exits its borders than a nation with a highly developed infrastructure
83
already in place, like the United States.
Similarly, a government can use its authority to permit or forbid
foreign companies from doing business within its borders to control
the telecommunications industry. 184 For example, the CCP required
Rupert Murdoch to remove the British Broadcast Channel (BBC)
from his Star TV satellite broadcasts into China, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong as a precondition to operate in China. 85
Just as the CCP can bootstrap existing governmental power to
the telecommunications industry, which now includes the Internet, so
to can it bootstrap the effect of raw exercises of authority in the past
to dissent in the present. The CCP has done this with a combination
of finesse and brute strength. Tiananmen Square remains the most
notable uprising by the people against the government in recent
Chinese history. A demonstration that had grown to one million
students planted itself in China's central square calling for
democracy. Then, on June 4, 1989, the CCP sent in tanks and
soldiers who fired on the crowd of one million, killing as many as one
thousand students, perhaps more. 186
If there was any doubt before June 4, 1989 that the CCP would
employ any means necessary to maintain its seat of authority, it was
extinguished by the public use of force in the face of revolution. The
CCP has exploited that certainty in every Chinese citizen's mind to
quiet possible political dissension via the Internet.
Most commentators have argued that the Internet in China will
either result in the CCP steering the nation towards a highly

179.
L.T. Greenberg & S.E. Goodman, Is Big Brother Hanging by His
Bootstraps?, 39 COMiM. OF THE ACM, July 1996, at 11, 14, atailable at

http:J/som.csudh.edulcisflpress/devnat/general/bigbro.thm.
180.

Id.

181.

Id.

182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.

185.
186.

Id.
Sheff, supranote 1, at 149.
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authoritarian state such as Singapore or towards spontaneous liberal
capitalism.' 8 7 However, analyzing the CCP's regulatory decisions in
the context of either of these two dichotomous outcomes is not
particularly useful. Rather, a more functional approach sheds light
on the CCP's choice of regulations.
The COP adheres to the ideological path of a "socialist market
economy," moving towards modernization. 88
At the Fourteenth
Party Congress in 1992, President Jiang stated that the socialist
system aimed to modernize. 8 9 In particular, he stated that "the
objective of socialism is to liberate and develop the productive forces,
to eliminate exploitation and polarization, and ultimately to achieve
common prosperity ....-19o Through this statement, Jiang expressed
a change in the definition of socialism; it is no longer a system whose
goal is to "guarantee egalitarianism."' 9 1
Rather, it is now
characterized by the development of productive forces. Therefore,
192
anything that spurs development is now, by definition, socialism.
In the same speech, Jiang iterated that socialism does not
necessarily involve central economic planning. 193 According to the
new definition of socialism, if a market economy increases productive
forces, then it is a socialist market economy, despite its effect on class
structure.

194

Jiang emphasized that the distinguishing characteristic of
socialism was not egalitarianism, but rather ownership. 195
In
socialism, public ownership dominates, while private ownership is
secondary. However, in Jiang's view, public ownership does not equal
public control. Instead, publicly-owned enterprises can be privately
managed. 196 Additionally, these publicly-owned enterprises would
compete in the market with private companies to increase
efficiency. 19 7 In this paradigm, the CCP is free to detach itself from
the operation of publicly-owned enterprises and act as a regulatory
body, overseeing the market. 198
Under this model, though the CCP does not operate the publiclyowned enterprises, it still benefits when they excel in the market.
Therefore, as a regulator, the CCP would naturally favor publicly-

187.
188.

RHETORIC
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See supranotes 13-14 and accompanying text.
ALAN. R. KLUVER, LEGITIMATING THE CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORMS:

OF MYTH AND ORTHODOXY 110 (1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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owned enterprises over private companies to maintain ideological
consistency. The superiority of publicly-owned enterprises over
private companies ensures adherence to the CCP's view of market
socialism. Adherence to market socialism in turn ensures that the
CCP will remain in power.
Therefore, as a functional matter, the CCP's regulatory scheme
is highly sustainable. The regulations are not a means towards a
"highly authoritarian state," nor are they a feeble attempt to have
complete control over the ubiquitous Internet.
Rather, the
regulations are a means for the CCP to ensure that publicly-owned
enterprises outnumber and outperform private companies, creating
political and ideological revenue. When publicly-owned enterprises
profit financially, it is testament to the fact that the CCP can
competently elevate the nation economically, thus increasing its
political power. When the means of that elevation is a socialist
market economy, the CCP's ideological structure is further
buttressed.
The CCP is desperately eager to take advantage of the potential
benefits of the Internet. However, like any political entity, it is
equally fervent about its self-preservation. In the end, a change in
the regulatory scheme will be achieved through either a top down or
bottom up effort. In a top down effort, a reform party would unseat
the CCP and introduce democratic and capitalist principles that will
be reflected in state regulations. Alternatively, the people of China
could disobey the current regulations and instigate a grassroots
Internet revolution. These two results may be equally likely or
unlikely. The only sure bet is that China will be true to its five
thousand year history. Its destiny as nation and a civilization rests
in the Chinese people's hands.

VIII. CONCLUSION
Through an analysis of two regulations typifying China's recent
effort to contain the Internet, it appears unlikely that the CCP's
ultimate goal is either to become an authoritarian state like
Singapore or to restrict the Internet to reduce politically incendiary
speech alone.
Rather, the CCP's seeks to increase economic
development and maintain political power. With regard to the
Internet, the CCP has already achieved its goal. For almost a decade,
it has been deriving moderate benefits from the Internet industry
while keeping political unrest in check.
To the CCP, the Internet is no different than any other form of
media. And like any other form of media, it can be "cleansed" of
politically harmful materials. Treating the Internet like traditional
forms of media also sends a message to the Chinese people that when
Internet regulations are disobeyed, the punishment will be
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commensurate to the punishment for disregarding restrictions on
traditional forms of media-namely extremely long prison sentences
or even death. No matter how easy it seems to be to communicate
displeasure with the CCP on the Internet, a citizen must always take
punishment into consideration.
Taking punishment into consideration, the question posed to the
Chinese people becomes: how much are you willing to risk for
freedom of speech? In 1989, the answer was death. Today, the
answer may very well be the same.
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